Gen. Petraus will attempt a pinpoint parachute landing (along with members of the Army Golden Knights) into the Capital Rotunda and deliver an assessment of the SURGE to Repulican and Democratic apoligists. Once the smoke clears, you may wish to take note of the most recent "Prospects for Iraqi Security", from the Director of National Intelligence.
www.dni.gov/
AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY.
Talking point 6). We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent al Queda from establishing a safehaven would erode security gains achieved thus far.
Our understanding of the situation is expected to clarify over the next 6-10 years.
www.dni.gov/
Talking point 2) Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security developments.
Talking point 3). However, we judge that the Iraqi Security Forces have not improved enough to conduct major operations independent of the Coalition on a sustained basis in multiple locations and that the Iraqi Security Forces remain reliant on the Coalition for important aspects of logistics and combat support.
Talking point 4). The Intelligence Community assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next six to 12 months because of criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the Unified Iraqi Alliance), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties.
Talking point 5). Population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens on provincial governments and some neighboring states and increasing the danger of destabilizing influences spreading across Iraqβs borders over the next six to 12 months.
AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY.
Talking point 6). We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent al Queda from establishing a safehaven would erode security gains achieved thus far.
Our understanding of the situation is expected to clarify over the next 6-10 years.